The evolution of Medicare Advantage markets in terms of plan quality under a competitive bonus payment system, where plans are rewarded based on their quality performance relative to peers in local markets is examined.

The paper analyzes Indian spectrum auctions where a nationwide license is reserved for a public operator, estimating revenue losses and trade-offs between government revenue and service coverage using a structural bidding model. Counterfactual simulations show that allowing the public operator to bid without subsidy increases expected revenue by about 7%, and that location-based subsidies can deliver higher revenue for a given coverage level than nationwide subsidies.

Poor treatment adherence is costly, and traditional models rely on unobserved behavioral preferences. A Vision Transformer analysis of EEG-ERP data identifies neural biomarkers that improve adherence prediction and support scalable precision-medicine interventions.

We propose a method to detect identities of colluding bidders in ascending price auctions exploiting both participation and bidding behavior.